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Summary findings
The remarkable performance of the Irish economy in  McCarthy focuses on three features of Ireland's
recent years has attracted much attention. Within a 10-  economic achievements. Two of these features are
year period the economy went from an 18 percent  external: the opening to Europe and the role of foreign
unemployment rate to nearly full employment, while the  direct investment. The third and perhaps most
ratio of debt to GDP fell from 120 percent to less than  "exportable"  feature is domestic: the role of a social
50 percent. Inevitably, this success was also accompanied  pact. This pact was initially between employers, trade
by problems, as infrastructure came under increasing  unions, and the government. Subsequent pacts were
stress, environmental difficulties became more evident,  extended to include a variety of other groups. McCarthy
and a changing social structure resulted in some groups  discusses the far-reaching impact of this series of pacts on
becoming increasingly marginalized.  health, poverty, employment, education, and social
What worked and what did not? In particular, are  welfare.
there lessons that may be relevant for other countries  Ireland now faces a number of challenges, including
facing similar difficulties, especially in Asia and Latin  the slowdown in the global economy, a fall in resource
America?  transfers from the European Union, and the potential
effects of the entry into the EU of Hungary and Poland.
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author may be contacted at fmccarthy@worldbank.org. December 2001.  (27 pages)
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Economic  development  has many diverse  features.  In recent  years  these  range  from the
remarkable  growth  enjoyed  by the United  States  in the 1990s,  to the turbulence  in Asia
and Latin  America  and  the dismal  performance  in much  of Africa.  As policymakers
search,  yet again,  for better  approaches,  any success  story attracts  a great  deal of
attention.  Inevitably  the remarkable  achievement  of the Irish economy  in recent  years
attracts  such  attention.  Selected  economic  data  are given  in Table 1. It is notable,  for
instance  that within  a ten year  period  the unemployment  level  went from 18 percent  to
near  full employment  (Figure  1), while  at the same  time  the debt to GDP ratio  went from
120  percent  to less  than 50 percent  (Figure  2). Inevitably  this success  was accompanied
by a number  of problems,  as infrastructure  became  more  stressed,  environmental
difficulties  became  more evident,  and a changing  social  structure  meant  that some  groups
became  increasingly  marginalized.  What  worked  and  what did not work?  Are there
lessons  to be garnered  from  this experience?'
The next section  of this  paper  provides  a brief  background  on the economy  and
how  the need for change  became  increasingly  evident  in the 1980s.  Although  there  were
many  influences  at work,  we choose  to focus  on three:  two external  and one domestic.
Even  with the benefit  of hindsight  it is not clear how  important  each  of these  was in
shaping  the development  process.  In section  three we discuss  two of the major external
features:  opening  to Europe  and  the role of foreign  direct  investment.  In section  four  we
discuss  a major domestic  feature-the social  pact and  the concomitant  macro  stability.
Section  five goes  on to discuss  some  of the results  of this first social  pact-primarily  the
impact  on exports  and the relatively  small,  at that stage,  impact  on employment.  In
section  six we discuss  the more  far-reaching  outcome  of the series  of pacts on
employment,  social  welfare,  health  and education  and  poverty.  Section  seven  offers some
of the preliminary  lessons  that may  be relevant  for other  countries  facing  similar
problems,  especially  the Asian and  Latin  American  developing  countries.
'The  Irish experience is discussed in a variety of sources, including Nolan and others (2000), OECD
Economic Surveys: Ireland (1999), Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report-Ireland (2001),
Sweeney(l 999)
3Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Current  government  exp.
(percent  of GNP)
Unemploy
ment
(% total  Gross  Fiscal  Current  Inflation  Real  exch.
GDP  labor  general  gov.  deficit  account  rate  rate  Social
Year  growth  force)  (Debt/GDP) (YoGDP) (%GDP)  (CPIJ) (earnings)  Education  Health Security
1981  3.33  9.9  78  -13.7  -14.6  20.3  91  6.0  7.3  10.4
1982  2.28  11.4  87.2  -13.3  -10.9  17.2  97  6.3  7.4  12.6
1983  -0.24  14.0  97.4  -10.9  -7.5  10.5  96  6.2  7.4  13.3
1984  4.35  15.6  102.5  -10.2  -6.6  8.6  96  6.2  7.1  13.6
1985  3.09  17.4  104  -10.3  -4.8  5.4  98  6.2  7.2  13.8
1986  4.43  i7.4  114.5  -10.3  -4.2  3.8  104  6.2  7.0  14.1
1987  4.66  16.9  116.8  -8.2  -1.3  3.2  102  6.3  6.6  13.6
1988  5.22  16.3  112.4  -4.3  -1.2  2.1  99  5.8  6.2  12.9
1989  5.81  15  101.8  -1.7  -2.9  4.0  96  5.6  6.0  11.9
1990  8.47  12.9  96.0  -2.2  -1.8  3.3  100  5.3  6.3  11.3
1991  1.93  14.7  95.3  -2.3  -0.4  3.2  98  5.4  6.7  12.0
1992  3.34  15.1  92.3  -2.4  0.4  3.0  100  5.8  7.0  12.6
1993  2.69  15.7  96.3  -2.3  3.7  1.4  94  5.9  7.1  12.2
1994  5.76  14.7  88.2  -1.7  2.9  2.4  92  5.9  7.0  11.7
1995  9.74  12.2  78.9  -2.2  2.8  2.5  93  5.5  6.8  11.7
1996  7.69  11.9  74.1  -0.6  3.3  1.7  95  5.3  6.5  10.7
1997  10.74  10.3  65.1  0.8  3.1  1.5  95  5.1  6.6  9.8
1998  8.56  7.8  55.0  2.1  0.9  2.4  92  4.9  6.5  9.0
1999  9.82  5.7  50.1  1.9  0.4  1.6  91  4.9  6.7  8.4
2000  It  4.3  39.1  4.7  -1.7  5.7  88
Note: Column  4: Before 1987,  Exchequer  borrowing  requirement  (-); from 1987,  General  Government  Surplus
(EU defmition).  (In 1987  EBR was almost exactly  the same  as GGS at 8.1.) Column  5: NIE 2000.  Column  7:
Based  on hourly  earnings.  Source:  Department  of Finance  (to 1990);  Central  Bank of Ireland.  Columns  8-10:  CSO:
Social  Protection  Accounts:  Expenditure  of Central  and Local  Governments.
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52.  Background
2.1  Dismal Performance
In the early part of the century Irish living standards were judged comparable to
those of north European economies such as Norway and Finland (O Grada 2001), with
per capita levels of about 50 per cent of the UK, but greater than countries such as Italy,
Greece and Portugal, and were converging toward levels in Britain and most of Western
Europe (Lee 1989).  Following independence in the 1920s Ireland's relative position
began to slip. Explanations offered for this dismal economic record include institutional
and cultural constraints on performance (Lee ibid); the policy of import-substituting
industrialization, pursued by the Fianna Fail Party after coming to power in 1932; and
more recently the effect of the fiscal response to the oil crises of the 1970s (O Grada and
O'Rourke (1995). For most of the twentieth century, even well into the late-1980s, the
economic record was a rather dismal one. The seemingly chronic unemployment situation
led to a large flow of emigrants and dampened any form of entrepreneurial activity.
Ironically the civil service was a beneficiary as this offered one of the main possibilities
of employment for those who chose not to emigrate. Entry was by an extremely
competitive exam, and this led to a stable and technically competent cadre, who later
played an important role in implementing the policy initiatives that followed.
The cultural ethos of Ireland meant that during these economically dismal times,
there had always been an ongoing empathy with the less fortunate; even during the
toughest time there was a general willingness to ensure they had some, albeit small,
social benefits for unemployment, health and education. Stipends were available to the
unemployed. Virtually all had access to some minimum health care. Education, at least
up to the primary school level was available to all, and was supported by a school
network that ensured that almost all potential students were within walking distance of a
school.
2.2  Needfor  Change
The overall approach to development sought to reflect to some extent the cultural
and social values of the society, but any significant improvements were largely stymied
by a seemingly ongoing chronic economic situation. The immediate impact of the two oil
shocks of the 1970s, further aggravated in the early 1980s by the high interest rates
resulting from the Volker anti-inflationary  policies, led to further difficulty for the Irish
economy. By the mid-1980s the situation had reached crisis proportions. In spite of
ongoing emigration, unemployment levels were around 18 percent by 1987, while the
6external debt-to-GDP ratio was close to 120 percent. There was even some discussion
about a possible default. There was an increasing awareness that much of the population
had reached the limits of their tolerance. A broad consensus emerged among all major
players that the situation needed to be addressed, and in particular public finances needed
to be sorted out. In 1987, the recently elected Prime Minister, C. Haughey, pushed
through a set of dramatic actions, by using all political means to win support for reform
measures to address the situation. The opposition showed political maturity by supporting
the required cuts, even at their own political cost. It was evident that the fiscal situation
needed to be addressed as soon as possible, but there was also a serious unemployment
problem, a strong resurgence of emigration,  poor economic growth and generally
deteriorating living standards. 2 A centerpiece of the reform was a social pact, Program for
National Recovery (1987-1990), which essentially removed most of the rancor from the
macro debate and resulted in stable labor relations.
3.  The Setting for Policy Change
3.1  Change
In addition to the social pact, and the associated improvement, several other
factors played salient roles. These included the openness to Europe, the break with
Sterling, the role of foreign direct investment (FDI), changes in technology, industrial
organization, and an increased awareness of the role of information. Because these
changes were contemporaneous, their specific impacts are quite difficult to unravel.
On the external side Ireland became a member of the European Community in
1973. This led to a broader free trade regime 3 and introduced significant changes in
benefits especially to the agriculture sector. Perhaps even more significant, it heralded a
change in behavior and perceptions. Previously the United Kingdom and the United
States tended to have a dominant role, not only in economic terms but also in terms of
how people framed their view of the world. Ireland had a long tradition of emigration and
cultural exchanges to both these countries, while economic policy was heavily influenced
2 It is interesting  to note  that  the Netherlands  faced  a crisis  in 1982  that  had many  features  similar  to
the Irish  situation.  They  managed  to address  many  of their  problems  and transform  their economy  by a set
of policies  that  combined  fiscal  consolidation,  reform  of benefits  programs,  wage  moderation.  This  was
also  done  through  extensive  consultation  and  cooperation  with  social  partners.  It is notable  that  the problem
of long-term  unemployment  remains  a challenge.  See  Watson  et al.(1999)  for  further  discussion
3 There  was already  free trade  vis-a-vis  Britain  from  the mid-1960s.
7by the United Kingdom, the dominant trading partner. The increasing importance of the
European dimension led to a new awakening of a more global nature. The younger
generation especially, began to look to Europe, and education became more
cosmopolitan. At a different level, policymakers were more aware of the de facto
constraints of Europe and the associated rewards for prudent action. Foreign business saw
the advantages of an English-speaking, well-educated populace with ready access to the
large European market, and the broad institutional stability provided by the European
umbrella. This institutional framework helped foster more transparent and responsible
behavior, supported by better monitoring and accountability, especially in the use of
public funds. As this virtuous cycle got underway there was a steady increase in the
overall entrepreneurial spirit and a more positive "can do " attitude. First, we discuss
briefly some of the steps that led to the opening to Europe.
3.2.  Opening to Europe
The direct implications ofjoining the European Economic Community in 1973
provided policy makers with clear markers to guide the economy along a more efficient
and less distorted path. While there were changes in many aspects of the economy some
of the more substantial were in two areas: trade and the agriculture sector.
Trade. Ireland became committed to joining a customs union with common
external barriers and, by 1977, had no internal trading barriers. Under the new free trade
regime Ireland's exports grew rapidly from 38 percent of GDP in 1973, to 62 percent by
1991, and to 86 percent by 1999. At the same time the composition and direction of trade
moved from exports of primary goods (mainly agricultural) to manufactures. 4 The
direction of trade moved away from the traditional dominant share of the United
Kingdom as shown in Table 2. The share for the European Union (EU) remained stable at
close to 40 percent while that for NAFTA.increased substantially from 9.1 percent in
1987 to 17.9 in 2000.
4 In 1987 agricultural produce was 17.5  percent of exports. This fell to 4.8 percent in 2000. Industrial
produce went from 80.2 percent to 92.8 over the same period.
8Table 2. Exports  by Area
(percentage)
Great  Britain  and
Period  Northern  Ireland  Other  EU  NAFTA  ROW  Total
1987  34.2  39.3  9.1  17.5  100
2000  22.2  39.8  17.9  20.1  100
Source:  Trade Statistics,  Central  Statistics  Office.
Agriculture. Ireland benefited greatly from transfers through the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This policy sought to support agricultural goods sold on the
world markets by maintaining them above world prices through closed markets. The
consumers paid the cost. Ireland, being a net exporter of farm goods, was a major
beneficiary. There are various estimates of the size of this transfer but it typically
represented around 2 to 6 percent of GNP per arnum.5 In 1981 agriculture accounted for
about 14.7 percent of employment. As the economy developed this share fell steadily to 9
percent in 2000. The numbers employed in agriculture fell from 167,000 to 117,000 over
this period. While one may argue about how appropriate the structural change was in
agriculture, the CAP transfers did provide a cushion during this transition. It remains an
open question whether providing a protective shield from the global competitive forces is
a good idea for the longer term. Many countries have also experienced the decreasing
importance of agriculture as an employment source. What is notable about the Irish
experience is that the sharp drop in agricultural employment was not accompanied by
major social unrest. Much of the surplus labor was absorbed into other sectors. For most
of the post 1973 period the other sectors were in the UK and US up to 1990. In the
nineties this was facilitated by having strong growth in other sectors, especially the
service sector, while at the same time support was provided by an active policy to address
unemployment.
5 Matthews  (1994).
9In addition  Ireland  also  received  resources  from three structural  funds,  the
European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF),  designed  to assist development  of the
poorer  regions;  the European  Social  Fund  (ESF),  and the Guidance  Section  of the CAP
funds  (EAGGF).  A fourth  fund,  the Cohesion  Fund directed  at transport  infrastructure
was established  under  the Maastricht  treaty  (1993).  While  some  of these flows  were
offset  by government  contributions  the net receipts  are estimated  at around  3 percent  of
GNP.
The broad  objective  of the structural  funds  was to enable  Ireland  to compete
unaided  in the Single  Market.  Initially  the allocation  of these  funds had varying  degrees
of success,  but over time a number  of measures  contributed  to improved  effectiveness  of
these  funds.  They  were targeted  at the development  of physical  and social  infrastructure.
For instance  Community  Support  Framework  (CSF)  for the period 1994-99 sought  to
allocate  funds  to priority  areas  in industry  and  human  resources  with an emphasis  on
transport  and  tourism.  This framework  was integrated  with domestic  policy  and
resources.  There  has been considerable  analysis  of the performance  achieved  under  these
funds.  In a detailed  mid-year  evaluation  of the CSF 1994-9  Honohan  (1997)  chose  to
dwell on a number  of problem  areas  and suggested  recommendations  for change.  For
instance  he identified  the need  for upgrading  certain  types  of public  infrastructure,  such
as non-urban  roads and urban  public  transport  to meet the needs  of the rapid economic
growth.  He also felt the need to better  focus  the active labor  policy  on those in need.
Sabel  (1996)  also reviews  many  of the institutional  innovations  introduced  by the Irish
government.  His focus is more  on how  they  sought  to address  issues  of social exclusion
in a more  flexible,  decentralized  and participative  way.  He identifies  the important  role to
be played  by local  partnerships  in reforming  public  administration.  While  he praises  the
innovative  dimension  of these  initiatives  he raises  some  question  about the need  to build
stable institutions  to sustain  them, especially  as the CSF resources  are likely  to diminish
in the near  future.
The transfer  of funds  made a substantial  contribution,  but some  of the benefits  of
the EU association  have come  in a more  indirect  manner.  The Maastricht  Treaty  that
became  effective  in 1993  provided  a clear  outline  for achieving  Economic  and Monetary
Union  (EMU)  by the end of the century.  This treaty came  after the stabilization  but it
helped  remove  (or at least sharply  reduced)  the possibility  of inappropriate  fiscal
expansionary  experiments  from the repertoire  of policymakers  by future governments.
Ireland  joined the European  Monetary  System  (EMS)  in 1979.  The initial
expectation  was that  Ireland  would  benefit  from the low  inflation  Deutsche  mark.  A
series  of devaluations  took  place, on average  about  one a year, with larger ones in 1983,
J01986, and 1992. For a small open economy like Ireland exchange rate policy is a major
concern as one seeks to balance the stability of a pegged system with the volatility of a
float. The Balassa-Samuelson dilemma of pegging a high to a low growth economy is
also likely to create some difficulty through inflation on non-tradables Presently the
European Council has established a European Central Bank and by 2002 the EMU will be
completed when the euro enters circulation. At that point Ireland will have as much
direct control over fiscal and monetary policy. This will create another set of challenges
not only in the economic sphere but also possibly politically, as some measure of
sovereignty is lost. In parallel with the opening to Europe was the increasing role to be
played by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
3.3  Foreign Direct Investment (EDI)
As the stabilization measures progressed it became evident that additional action
was needed to stimulate economic growth and address the unemployment problem. Given
the large external debt at the time (120 percent of GDP in 1987), it was evident that the
export sector needed to play a larger role. This in turn required a competitive economy
supported by adequate investment both in quantity and quality. With the macro situation
essentially out of the debate and stable labor relations in place, the focus then turned to
growth. The domestic economy after years of indifferent performance was largely ill
prepared to face international competition; much of the public sector had structural
difficulties in terms of communications, transport, and power. The Industrial
Development  Authority (IDA), which had considerable experience in attracting foreign
firms but a mixed record in earlier years, sought to attract dynamic American firrns. A
well-educated work force, English-speaking, good labor relations and access to the large
European market was a major attraction, along with a low corporate tax rate, 10 percent
after 1979.6  However the experience in the 1970s and early 1980s indicated that although
some foreign firms took advantage of the various enticements, it did not lead to a strong
impact on the economy. Linkages to the rest of the economy were often weak, and some
of these companies tended to gravitate toward more favorable offers as they appeared in
other countries.
In the late 1980s a number of factors changed at the global level. Major changes
in industrial structure 7 occurred as multinationals  moved from the mass production model
6 The European Commission  viewed the special rate of taxation as a state subsidy. The government is
now committed to having a standard rate of corporate taxation at 12.5  percent by 2003.
7 For an excellent discussion see Sabel (1996).
11towards the Japanese style of greater flexibility. This in turn led to foreign branches of
these companies moving away from relatively insulated units, and toward a more flexible
model and one more integrated with the local economy. At the same time the companies
of the "new" economy were intrinsically more flexible. In particular new technology
reduced transport and communications costs, so that the geographic disadvantage of
being an island economy was sharply reduced. The IDA strategy was quick to perceive
these new trends, and was able to attract a number of flagship companies enjoying rapid
growth at the global level, such Intel and Microsoft. At the same time the IDA offered a
good platform for many of the large chemical and pharmaceutical multinationals. While
the domestic companies were somewhat slower in reacting to the improved economic
conditions, these multinationals were able to produce a dramatic increase in exports. By
1990 exports showed an annual increase of 8 percent.8
During the initial three-year pact the strong increase in GDP and especially in
exports was not accompanied by serious inroads into the unemployment problem. There
was some discussion about these multinationals producing growth without employment,
while other critics felt they were simply using transfer pricing to take advantage of the
favorable corporate tax rates. However these new companies were building linkages with
domestic suppliers, and this was to become increasingly evident during the next few
years. Given the small size of the domestic market, the output of these companies was
heavily dependent on external demand, and therefore sensitive to the health of the global
economy. In a favorable global climate, especially for the technology sector, this FDI
strategy has a lot to offer. In addition to the direct impact on employment and exports, it
helped foster links to many domestic companies and also strengthened entrepreneurial
skills. In the event of a less favorable global climate, however, especially for the
technology sector, policymakers will face serious challenges. While one can expect a
long term benefit from gains in knowledge and entrepreneurial externalities, the fact
remains that many of the companies will continue to seek market advantages wherever
they occur and may be foot loose. The feature of greater links to the domestic economy
may turn out to be a disadvantage in any dramatic economic downturn. In this context it
would be helpful to examine to what extent the FDI success is driven by a favorable tax
regime and to what extent other features such as access to Europe, English speaking well
educated workforce play a role.
4.  Social Pact
8 The volume  index was to quadruple  from 1990  to 2000,  an average  annual growth  rate  of 15  percent.
124.1  Program for National Recovery
In order  to understand  the setting  for the social  pact of 1987  and  the five
subsequent  versions  one  needs  an appreciation  of many domestic  factors.  While  one must
not underestimate  the achievement  of the social  pact, the timing  was particularly
fortuitous. 9 The major  political  parties  were  willing  to support  the necessary  measures.
The global  economy  was entering  a relatively  buoyant  phase so that  risk taking,  in the
choice  of industry  for supports  for instance,  was well  rewarded.  Historically  trade-union-
management  relations  in Ireland  had  been often  adversarial.  However  in the late 1980s,
the weak  position  of the economy  and the increasing  role of some  forward-thinking  union
leaders  facilitated  a tripartite  agreement  between  unions,  employers,  and government.  '0
The Program  for National  Recovery  (PNR) was able  to draw  on analysis  from the
Strategy  for Development  (1986)  produced  by the National  Economic  and Social  Council
(NESC). 1' The NESC  is an advisory  body  that analyses  policy  issues and seeks
consensus.  Its members  include  representatives  of the employers,  trade unions,
agriculture  sector  and senior  civil servants.  A number  of authors  have  written  on the roots
of this plan.  12 Much of this work  had  been carried  out during  the tenure  of the previous
government,  and  thus was at least  implicitly  in line with the policy  objectives  of the then
opposition  party.  This allowed  for broad  political  support.  The agreement  covered  a wide
array  of issues  of importance  to all groups.  A key outcome  was to establish  a formula  for
moderate  wage  agreements  over  the next  three years,  which  provided  for modest  annual
increases  and helped  ensure  relatively  peaceful  labor  relations  over that  period.  In return
the government  agreed  to reform  income  tax in favor  of employees.  The agreement  also
ensured  that welfare  would  not have  to bear  most of the brunt  of the fiscal
retrenchment.1 3 In fact welfare  spending  did show  a modest  absolute  increase  but not as a
9 There  are some  who  would  argue  that  it was only  when  the situation  became  truly  desperate  that a
consensus  evolved  and  so it was endogeneous  to the crisis.
10  Over  time  the partnership  was widened  to include  representatives  of voluntary  and community
organizations.  Partnership  2000  involved  representatives  of the unemployed,  women's  groups  and others
addressing  social  exclusion.
" This  was  to be the first  of five subsequent  agreements.  Each  social  partnership  agreement  was
preceded  by a NESC Strategy  report.  These  set out the shared  perspective  of the social  partners  on the
parameters  within  which  a new  program  should  be negotiated  (see  O'Donnell  in Wallace  2001).
12 O'Donnell  (2001)  suggests  that  Ireland,  together  with  some  other  small  European  member  states  are
inventing  a new  post-corporatist  form  of macroeconomic  concertation  and structural  reform,  which  differs
from the dominant  continental  European  models-German,  French  and Scandinavian.
13 The Irish  social  welfare  system  does  not lend itself  to easy  categorization.  Much  of the features
13share of the economy. The program was to be monitored by a Central Review
Committee, with all key questions subject to consultation  between the partners. Even
with the agreement in place, the fiscal retrenchment required strong backing from the
highest levels of government. The fiscal crisis and its resolution was a key part of the
social agreement. This is discussed in detail by Honohan (1998).
4.2  Fiscal Policy
In 1986 the current budget deficit was 7.9 percent of GDP while the public sector
borrowing requirement (PSBR) was 14.2 percent of GDP. By 1990 the corresponding
figures had dropped to 0.6 and 2.8, respectively.' 4 During these years total revenue share
went from 37.9 to 34.5 percent of GNP while spending fell dramatically from 45.8 to
35.1 percent of GNP. Given the rapid increase in GNP during this period the revenue did
not change much in absolute terms but the spending cuts were substantial. Why this was
achieved so quickly after many years of failed adjustment approaches? Although
Honohan (1998) reviews many explanations, no single theory seems to offer a convincing
explanation.' 5 However a decisive explanation would include political determination
together with some measure of good luck. Fiscal policy included a freeze on recruitment,
an early retirement scheme, cutbacks and postponements of public infrastructure,
including public housing. All increases were essentially denied and demands from local
political groups were resisted. Clear political backing allowed the Finance Minister, Ray
MacSharry to restrain public spending, which wiped out the fiscal deficit in three years.
Political restraints were further supported by instructions to all government departments
to hold the line on expenditures. The relative strength of the civil service, and especially
the senior civil servants in these departments, helped ensure the success of this effort. The
fiscal effort was given further support when a tax amnesty in 1988 yielded results above
most expectations. This amnesty was backed by credible threats, so that not only the
followed  from  that of the UK and so may  be loosely  termed  liberal.  In the nid- I  990s  expenditure  on social
insurance  plus social  assistance  at about 10  percent  of GDP  meant  that  Ireland  was among  the lowest  in
Europe.  See Callan  and  Nolan  (2000).  The other  major  welfare  expenditures  were health  and education
which  typically  added  a further  10  percent  (see  Table 1 for  yearly  figures).
4 Departnent  of Finance.
15 He does  place some  credence  on the lower  opportunity  cost during  prolonged  recession  for business
to restructure  their activity.  He also  notes the importance  of becoming  competitive,  underpinned  by wage
restraint  and favorable  exchange  rate and  having  a favorable  world  demand  situation.  Thus the recovery
was export  led, followed  by consumption  and investment.  These  help  explain  investment  and  growth  but
not the reduction  in the deficit.
14immediate  revenue  improved,  but it also  helped  ensure  improved  compliance  in future
years.
Structural  funds  from the EU averaged  1.5  percent of GNP in the 1980s,  and
increased  to 2.6 percent  in the 1990s.  These  were used largely  for infrastructure
investment  and  resumption  of projects  deferred  during  the fiscal crunch.
4.3 Exchange Rate
Fiscal  balance  needed  to be complemented  with an appropriate  exchange  rate.
Ireland  joined the EMS  in 1979.  The real exchange  rate,  as shown  in Table 1,
experienced  an appreciation  of about 1  percent  per year  against  other  countries  in the
system.  This was due to a higher  rate of wage  and  price inflation  in Ireland.  This upward
trend slowed  in the late 1  980s  due  to domestic  wage  restraint.  The real exchange  rate
remained  competitive  until 1992  (see Table 1)  when the Bank  of England  withdrew
sterling  from the ERM and there  was a subsequent  fall of 15 percent  by sterling  on the
foreign  exchange  market.  This resulted  in overvaluation  of the Irish  pound relative  to
sterling  with loss of competitiveness  for trade with  the UK. After  expensive  intervention
the Central  Bank  devalued  by 10  percent  in early 1993.  For the rest of the 1990s  Ireland
was able  to take advantage  of the flexibility  of the ERM to maintain  competitiveness.  But
with the advent  of the EMU, room  for adjustment  becomes  much  tighter.  The successful
fiscal  correction,  competitive  real exchange  rare and a concomitant  fall in interest  rates
provided  a necessary  macro  basis for growth.  These achievements  were to be locked  in
by the adoption  of the Maastricht  criteria  from 1992  onward.  The fiscal adjustment  was
quite  painful.  Many countries  have also  undergone  similar  adjustments  but with
indifferent  results.  In Ireland  the broad  political  support,  the EU institutional  umbrella
lent credibility  and of course  the good  fortune  of a strong  global  economy  led to dramatic
results.
5.  Early Results
5.1  First Results
The immediate  results  were quite remarkable.  By 1990  the GDP growth  rate
reached  8.5 percent.  The primary  deficit 16 of 1.8  percent  of GNP in 1986  shifted  to a
surplus  of 6.9 percent  of GNP in 1990.  Exports  increased  by 48 percent (in volume
16 Department  of Finance.  The primary  deficit  is the exchequer  borrowing  requirement  exclusive  of
interest  payment.
Isterms) over the same period. As the virtuous cycle ensued, confidence in the overall
policy approach began to increase and the tripartite agreement was followed by a series
of three-year agreements: (1) the Program for Economic and Social Progress (PESP)
1990-93, (2) the Program for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 1994-96, (3) the
Partnership 2000, 1997-2000, and (4) the latest, the Program for Prosperity and Fairness
(PPF), 2000. In each of these agreements increasing attention was devoted to the broader
issues of distribution and structural reform. In the early 1990s unemployment and
emigration were dominant concerns. As economic gains continued through the 1990s the
agreements placed increasing emphasis on social cohesion, regional development, and
poverty.
5.2  Unemployment
During the first plan period the great improvements in most aspects of the
economy were not matched by similar progress to reduce unemployment, which only
began after 1993. There has been considerable analysis of what exactly was achieved
during this first PNR. Various experts tend to highlight different features. McAleese
(1997) places emphasis on the improvement in competitiveness of the overall economy.
He notes the role of the move to free trade, macro stability, acceptance of competition
and the market system and growth that ensued, paradoxically through reductions in the
fiscal deficit. 17 A compendium of papers by distinguished economists commissioned  by
Gray (1997) offered a variety of explanations ".  The sheer variety of these explanations
is perhaps testament to the lack of any dominant theory, but it also emphasizes the
importance of Ireland specific factors with which many of the participants may not have
been particularly familiar. O'Donnell (1998), from a somewhat different perspective, also
notes the importance of achieving a competitive advantage but places considerable
emphasis on social inclusion. His analysis of the Irish Social Partnership suggests that it
was not a bargaining solution between the partners but rather "a shared understanding of
the problems facing the Irish economy and society and the main lines of policy required
to address them." He highlights the change in institutions, that facilitated a realistic
discussion of change rather than a political system that tended to clientelism; a more
17  For a more  complete  discussion  of how tighter  fiscal  policy  can produce  a virtuous  circle and lead to
growth  see  McAleese  (2001).  See also  Barry  and Devereux  (1995)  who suggest  that  other effects,  such as
the confidence  boosting  relation  with  the German  economy  may have  had an important  role.
18 These  included  Krugman's  view  of the importance  of technological  changes  in transport  and
communications,  Sachs's  orthodox  view  with  emphasis  on the role of FDI,  Vickers  emphasis  on the role of
privatizing  state monopolies  and ensuring  adequate  competition.
16forward-looking trade union movement; enterprises that came to realize that they could
no longer count on direct and indirect protection. Sabel (1996) also notes the need for an
open, competitive economy. He also highlights the important role played by creation of
more locally based partnerships to address issues of social exclusion and unemployment
in a more flexible, decentralized and participative way.
By 1990 there was a broad acceptance by all groups of the need to address the
problem of unemployment and especially long-term unemployment. In the 1970s and
especially in the early 1980s, as protection was removed from domestic industry and
adjustment to the European market progressed, the international market became more
competitive. As a result, many of the "traditional " Irish industries suffered. The auto,
textile, and leather goods sectors declined precipitously, and at least initially,
employment losses were not offset by the more buoyant chemical, pharmaceutical, and
electronic sectors, which tended to be more capital intensive. The situation was further
compounded in the 1980s by the sluggish British and U.S. economies, which were the
traditional destinations for Iri'sh emigration. The result was a dramatic rise in
unemployment to around 17.4 percent in 1986. Even by 1993 this level had changed
little. Even more disconcerting was the level among the long-term (more than 12 months)
unemployed. Their share of the total went from,  about one-third to half of the total during
this period. This long-term rate was particularly worrisome as this group also had an
associated problem of poverty and social exclusion. Many measures were adopted to
address these problems. Since 1993 the unemployment situation has improved
remarkably as the unemployment rate had dropped to 3.9 percent by the 4kh  quarter of
2000. At the same time the size of the labor force increased to 1.8 million from 1.3
million in 1987. There are a number of reasons to account for this on both the supply and
demand side. These include
*  the rapid increase in participation rates especially among females,
*  the extremely high economic growth rates and the gradual spread of this growth
to other parts of the domestic economy especially in the service sectors,
*  growth in government expenditure for health and education,
*  an active labor policy, and
*  immigration -many Irish returned home, an active government policy recruited
abroad, and autonomous flows of workers from Eastern European and African
countries. It is notable that most of the Irish who returned during the nineties were
generally better educated than those that had left Ireland in earlier periods. They
brought considerable technical and entrepreneurial skills and fitted in quite well
with the demands of the more dynamic economy.
176.  Selected  Outcomes
6.1  Labor Policy
A study of the labor market by O'Connell (2000) provides some insight on which
approaches seem to have given the best results. Expenditures on active labor market
programs in Ireland amounted to 1.75 percent of GDP in 1996. Remuneration scales for
participants ensured that they had a net gain above their social benefits. His broad finding
was, that programs with strong linkages to the labor market were more likely to improve
job prospects of participants than those with weak market linkages. These findings held
across all age groups. Unfortunately for many of the long-term unemployed, programs
with weak market linkages were the only vehicles available. Although public works
programs, such as cleaning up canals, had a certain social value, they were not sufficient
to significantly improve job prospects for participants. O'Connell's  findings suggest that
in order to achieve eventual re-integration into the labor market, they would need to
progress to schemes tailored to particular needs. For many in the long-term category the
objective should be to have them progress to programs with high net placement rates.
This in tum may require individual consideration. Some groups, such as single mothers
for instance, often face rather specific constraints, such as the need for jobs with flextime
to allow them carry out their other responsibilities. The most recent plan, PPF (2001),
recognizes the need for a more personalized and consequently more costly approach, to
address this need.
6.2  Social Welfare
The high levels of unemployment in the 1980s followed by the relatively
successful period of the late 1990s led to significant changes in social expenditures and in
particular the implementation of tax and welfare structures.  1 9 The major thrust of the
social partnership has been wage moderation in exchange for tax cuts. The three principal
components of current spending on social welfare are education, health and income
maintenance or broadly what is termed social security (see O'Riain and O'Connell,
2000).2o  Social welfare has three broad objectives, poverty alleviation, protection of
living standards, and redistribution along the life cycle. The Irish welfare state seeks to
19  For a good  exposition  see Callan  and  Nolan  (2000).
2 Historically  housing  has been  an important  component  of pubic expenditure.  In Ireland  house
ownership  has  been one of the highest  in the world  at around  80 percent.  Since 1987  a change  in policy  has
resulted  in a fall of expenditures  on housing  from  5 percent  of public  expenditure  in 1987  to 2.5 percent  in
1990.  For a discussion  of this policy  change  see Fahey  and  Williams  (2000).
18provide a basic level of security and service to virtually all residents. At the same time, it
also allows those with market-generated advantages to supplement their social citizenship
right, with their own resources (O'Connell and Rottman, 1992). Thus it may be termed a
pay-related welfare state. Social security has two main schemes; social insurance with
contributions from employers, employees and the state; social assistance, with means
tested payments for those in old age and unemployment categories. Under the terms of
the social partnership accords, the real value of unemployment benefits and assistance
payments have been maintained and even increased some since 1987. At the same time
the state has spent substantial amounts (1.75 percent of GDP in 1996) on active labor
market policies. Thus, while the Irish approach contrasts with the liberal approaches
adopted in other European countries, the actual expenditures are lower than most EU
countries. In 1987, Ireland spent about 13 percent of GDP on social security but by 1997
this number had dropped to 9 percent. Thus the steady rise in individual payments was
more than offset by the buoyant economy.
6.3  Health and Education  I
Expenditures on education and health follow a similar pattern. In 1967 second
level education was made free, and in 1968 means-tested grants for third-level education
were introduced so that educational participation increased dramatically in the following
decades. In 1985 spending accounted for 6 percent of GDP and then following a drop of
about 2.5 percent of over the period 1987-90, real expenditures increased so that by 1997
they were about 50 percent greater. This contributed to the highly skilled work force that
helped propel the economic growth of the 1990s.
Expenditures on health throughout the period 1987 to 1997 tended to increase
modestly to about 7 percent of GDP, but from lower levels in the 1980s (see Table 1).
However, because of the spectacular growth rates they increased by 78 percent in real
terms over this period but remain lower than most OECD countries. The basic approach
to health care has followed a similar pattern to social security. About one-third of the
population has free access to health care, the remainder have access to public hospitals at
a modest fee but much of the two-thirds subscribe to private health insurance. Taxation
provides for 75 percent of health expenditure. There is some debate about the
effectiveness and equity of the overall health system, with long waiting lists for hospital
services being a major concern. The situation is further compounded by the demographic
pattern as the proportion of older citizens increases.
196.4  Poverty
Given  the remarkable  growth  rates  in the economy  over  the 1990s  what happened
to poverty  levels?  In terms of conventional  measures  of purchasing  power  and income
there  was a dramatic  decline  in poverty  levels as most people  moved  up. If one focuses
on relative  poverty  then  the situation  is more  complex.  Recent  work by Layte  and others
(2001)  suggests  that  using income  at a point  in time,  especially  in an economy
experiencing  very rapid growth  in average  incomes,  does  not give a comprehensive
indicator  of living standards  or poverty.  It is important  to complement  relative income
poverty  lines  with other  approaches.  They  use a number  of noneconomic  indicators  to
develop  a measure  of deprivation. 2' During  the 1990s  average  household  real incomes
rose rapidly,  unemployment  fell sharply  and social  welfare  personal  rates rose in real
terms,  but not as much  as other  incomes.  The net effect  was numbers  on social  welfare
fell but the remaining  recipients  fell further  behind  the average.  There have been  some
changes  in the composition  of the income  and deprivation  poverty  categories.  Within
these  categories  one finds  certain  dynamic  features.  The less advantaged  classes tend  to
be the unemployed,  the ill/disabled,  the retired  and those  in home duties.  Persistent
unemployment  was more  prevalent  among  the unskilled  manual  class and those  without
educational  qualifications.  The findings  seem  to confirm  the policy  orientation  of
addressing  unemployment  through  an active  labor strategy,  and a comprehensive
education  program.  If one holds constant  in real  terms a poverty  line then there was a
substantial  decline  in the numbers  below  that  line during  the nineties.  However  in a
situation  with rapidly  rising  average  incomes  societal  expectations  change  and the
concept  of relative  poverty  becomes  relevant.  Using  non-monetary  indicators  of




While  it is premature  to make any unqualified  judgment  on the Irish experience  of
the 1990s  a number  of salient  features  emerge.  While  it is not likely any one country  can
hope to replicate  all of the features  of the Irish approach,  some  aspects  may offer useful
21 These  measures  included  three dimensions,  basic life-style  deprivation,  secondary  life-style
deprivation  and  housing  deprivation.  Further  details  on how these  relate to deprivation  and social  exclusion
are given  in Layte  and others  (2000).
20ideas for countries  that are also facing  similar  problems  to those faced  by Ireland  in the
late 1980s.  These  included  a difficult  stabilization  problem  needing  a major fiscal
correction,  virtually  untenable  debt/GDP  ratio, very high unemployment  level,  large
share  of the workforce  in agriculture,  and a general  lack of confidence  in the institutions
to address  the issues.  These  problems  need  to be viewed  in the overall context  of what
was happening,  in both the global  and  domestic  economy  at that time,  together  with an
awareness  of specifically  Irish characteristics.  Historically  there has been a relatively  low
tolerance  for social inequity.  It is interesting  to note that even as overall  real incomes
increased  considerable  attention  was paid  to relative  poverty.  The extended  periods  of
economic  weakness  also meant  that most  were relatively  risk averse,  although  the
younger  generation  was less so. With  these considerations  in mind, it may be of interest
to summarize  how  Ireland  addressed  some  of the problems  that are, unfortunately,
common  in other  countries.  A recent  piece  by Rice and  Johnstone  (2000)  analyzing  the
economic  situation  in Scotland  was able  to identify  some  of problems  that country
needed  to address  by reviewing  the Irish  experience.
7.2  Macro
Fiscal  deficit/social  pact. The deficit  was "solved  " over a brief three-year  period
by first having  the clear support  of all major  political  parties.  The objectives  were  made
clear  to the public and forceful  leadership  was applied  in the political,  fiscal,  and social
development  realms.  The strategy  involved  a social  pact having  a broad-based  coalition
of unions,  management,  and government.  Labor  basically  agreed  to wage  moderation  in
return  for reduced  taxation.  The "pain  " of the stabilization  was made transparent  and
spread  across  all groups  but with protection  for social  welfare.  For many analysts  the
adoption  of the social  pact provided  the key to the subsequent  virtuous  cycle.  This
approach ensured that all key groups were aware of the objectives and realized
what they were to gain by going along with the measures.
Exchange rate. The broad policy here was to keep a competitive real rate. When
this got out of line with key trading partners the authorities devalued the currency. The
EMS offered a certain flexibility. The EMU is expected to have various escape clauses
when exceptional circumstances warrant, but will not afford policymakers as much
flexibility, thus requiring some innovative thinking on their part.
External debt. The debt-to-GDP ratio in 1987 was around 120 percent. The
confidence  that ensued  from the believable  stabilization  measures,  allowed  for favorable
interest rates, though initially not quite as low as Deutsche mark rates. There was no early
effort to achieve a precipitous reduction in the nominal stock of debt, as the social
21consensus placed higher priority, in the short term, on other expenditure priorities. Over
time  the lower financing  needs  and high growth  rates  allowed  for a smooth
reduction  in the debt-to-GDP  ratio.
7.3  European Union
The role of the European union was quite complex. The direct impact of resource
transfers was substantial, especially on agriculture, infrastructure and social cohesion. It
also provided an institutional umbrella that helped drive the stabilization process and
once in place, to galvanize it. This de facto supervision cum incentive structure helped
support domestic politicians, who sought greater accountability and transparency in the
use of public  funds. While  it may  not be realistic  for many  countries  to aspire to
membership  in the EU, the concept  of being part of some  umbrella  group  which can
provide  some form  of de facto  guidance  and appropriate  incentives  warrants  careful
consideration.
7.4  Foreign Direct Investment
The strategy adopted towards FDI helped contribute substantially to the rapid
growth of the economy, especially the export sector. A favorable corporate tax regime,
supported by double-taxation treaties with the United States and other FDI source
countries, together with a well-educated English-speaking labor force, and the large
European market were major attractions. The IDA strategy to focus initially on a few
high profile multi nationals in the IT and chemical areas was also fortuitous, as their
industrial structure lent itself to a certain flexibility, while at the same time the global
demand for their output was going through a strong growth phase. Underlying this
strategy was the increasing confidence that Ireland would indeed be a reliable bridge to
Europe. This was provided by membership in the EU and further reinforced by favorable
support of the Maastricht treaty. This in turn led to a favorable investment climate and a
change in how companies saw Ireland. Rather than locating relatively simple company
offshoots they were now willing to set up more diverse operations and in some instances
their European headquarters -a substantial change in the historic approach to FDI.
7.5  Social Welfare
The broad approach was to maintain real levels during the fiscal stabilization.
This ensured the less fortunate a basic stipend if unemployed, while free education and
health care services were also maintained. Although seemingly obvious, analysis of the
22poorer groups indicated that unemployment was a key factor. 22 This in turn led to an
active labor policy. The more successful policies tended to be focused on the labor
market demand. A potent force underlying this success was the expansion of Aggregate
Demand. For the long-term unemployed, who lacked adequate education to enter
employment focused groups, some preliminary public works programs provided an initial
step. For much further progress on the difficult area of addressing the long-term
unemployed, it now seems necessary to move to a more personal approach. As incomes
increased  a broader  range of social/cultural  questions  arose.  A variety  of policies
were devised to address issues of social exclusion while the whole concept of poverty
was extended  to include  a variety  of noneconomic  indicators  to assess  relative
poverty.
7.5  Structural Change.
During the 1990s agriculture declined and the service sector grew. This structural
shift occurred in many countries and indeed seems to be an inevitable feature of
development. In Ireland the decline in numbers and incomes for the agriculture sector has
been cushioned by the large transfers under the CAP scheme, together with a protective
wall for European agriculture. At the same time the rest of the economy grew rapidly so
that the surplus labor was readily absorbed. At least in the short term, the strategy has
been successful in reducing the numbers in agriculture and there has also been some
investment in a variety of food-based products. However incomes for those left in
agriculture remain low, and pressure from the World Trade Organization is also likely to
result in further reductions in supports.
8.  Conclusion
The experience of Ireland in the 1990s has been remarkable as it went from being
a highly indebted, high unemployment country to a low-debt, low-unemployment country
in ten years. Stabilization was achieved in about three years by having a credible political
effort with a broad-based social pact. Broad-based support ensured moderate wage
increases in exchange for tax concessions together with a guaranteed social welfare
package for all. This effort was further consolidated by the broad based institutional
umbrella of the European Union, which provided a combination of de facto rules and an
array of resource transfers. Growth was achieved by a combination of innovative
22 This  differs  somewhat  from most  of the other  European  countries  where  the poorer  groups  tend  to be
dorninated  by retirees.
23measures, to attract FDI initially and then a more buoyant domestic demand supported by
pari-pasu reductions in the tax burden. Social programs were protected by consensus
agreement. Analysis of the poverty situation identified unemployment as a major
underlying cause. This was then addressed by an active labor policy.
Is this sustainable? Much of the success is based on external factors. The risks
here include the likely decline in resources from the EU, a fall in global demand for
exports and a fall in investment by multinationals. Further challenges will result from the
potential effects of the entry of Poland/Hungary into the EU. On the domestic side there
are a number of emerging constraints on infrastructure, roads, power, housing, while
environment concerns are likely to move toward center stage. Policymakers will need to
have appropriate responses at hand, to address any downturns in the global economy,
while at the same time incorporating sufficient flexibility into the use of domestic
resources to meet infrastructure needs. Over the longer term the key economic variables
are human resources and investment and of course what kind of society the people want.
This requires a keen appreciation of the demographic forces as the population ages and
hard choices are made on such areas as distribution, social cohesion and immigration
policy. The present education system has served the country well in recent years. On the
other hand the health system is in need of upgrading. Both these areas need to be
continually upgraded, to meet the population's expectations, and in particular to ensure a
healthy labor force with high value skills. Pervading all these policy choices is the issue
of the appropriate role for public and private sectors. The approach up until now has been
a rather pragmatic one. An important consideration is that in a small domestic economy it
may be somewhat unrealistic to expect to have many firms competing in certain sectors.
There have been movements to privatize some public entities, while others have been
subjected to regulation and supervision. These decisions will become increasingly
difficult over time as the authorities come to grips with the need to ensure a competitive
economy, and also ensure adequate incentives for investment while maintaining the
desired level of social cohesion.
For other countries, especially those in the ASEM group and Latin America, what
can be learned?
*  Europe is not available to all, but they can devise their own way of embracing
some of the advantages it offers. These include the advantage of having an
umbrella that provides de facto supervision cum incentive structure. In the Ireland
situation this facilitated stable policies together with low interest rates and high
growth rates. Certainly the inward transfer of funds that amounted to several
24percentage points a year, helped in reducing the external debt load and also
sustaining investment in infrastructure during the difficult fiscal adjustment.
However many other countries have received similar transfers from a variety of
sources without achieving very notable results. Even within the EU its Court of
Auditors considered the Irish use of funds among the more effective. A more
detailed study would help provide useful lessons for other countries and
especially  those contemplating entry into the EU on the efficient use of transfers.
*  FDI success requires administrative capacity and policy stability. These can be
built over time. Education can also be strengthened over time. Some of the social
and cultural affinities may limit the opportunities for some countries. But again,
viewed in the broader context, a winning strategy needs access to markets and the
required technology. The EU was an important element of the  rish story. For
many countries the EU may not be available but some of the salient features may
be. Some degree of confidence in a country's institutions may be achieved if
measures are put in place to ensure appropriate guarantees. These might range
from acceptable accounting standards to ensuring a fair and equitable legal
system. In the Irish case this confidence resulted in some measure from EU
membership.
*  The social partnership is perhaps the most obvious exportable. The approach to
analyzing poverty and unemployrnent are notable. If a country has to impose
fiscal retrenchment much better to do it via cuts in spending than by increasing
taxes. In its most pragmatic form it requires that all key groups reach agreement
on the direction of policy, and this is reinforced by ensuring that each will gain
over time by their support.
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